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UID:20260706T170907EDT-2637wJWIBI@132.216.98.100
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DESCRIPTION: \n\nMr. Hedayat Alibeiki\, a doctoral student at 91ºÚÁÏÍø Univer
 sity in the Operations Management area will be presenting his thesis defen
 ce entitled:\n\nTwo essays on power and information asymmetries in competi
 tive supply chains\n\nDate: Tuesday\, May 30\, 2017\n	Time: 1:15 pm\n	Locati
 on: Room 310\, Bronfman Building\n\nAbstract\n\nChannel parties in today's
  competitive supply chains are increasingly becoming asymmetric in their p
 ower and the level of information they possess regarding several important
  aspects of their businesses. Even though these asymmetries can be benefic
 ial for some parties\, they might create frictions towards other parties' 
 regular practice and profitability.  Studying these asymmetries can be hel
 pful for all parties when making their strategic decisions.  In particular
 \, it helps weak and uninformed players to improve their strategies on how
  to respond to the additional power of their partners or competitors in th
 e market\, while the dominant players might want to reinforce these asymme
 tries as sources and prerequisites for their competitive advantages in the
  marketplace. This dissertation examines asymmetries in operations and sup
 ply chain management through two specific applications\, which has resulte
 d in two essays. The first one focuses on the impacts of market power and 
 cost asymmetries in retail operations. More specifically\, it analyzes the
  effects of superior cost advantage and price leadership possessed by a do
 minant retailer on his assortment choice. Using several game-theoretical m
 odels\, this essay aims to explain the asymmetry related causes for the re
 tail assortment reduction\, a practice taken by many big-box retailers in 
 some product categories. The second essay is related to the information as
 ymmetry in sourcing and supply management. More precisely\, it looks at th
 e buyers' private information regarding the quality scores of their suppli
 ers in price-plus buyer-determined procurement (reverse) auctions. The gen
 eral goal in this essay is to understand the informational and strategic i
 mplications of non-price attributes in procurement auctions as an increasi
 ngly popular sourcing mechanism. Using the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium solut
 ion concept\, this essay provides normative recommendations to the buyers 
 on when and how to share this information with the suppliers. In different
  ways\, both essays support the idea that information and power asymmetrie
 s significantly change the motivation and action of channel partners in th
 eir operational decisions.\n\nStudent Committee Co-Chairs:  Professor Shan
 ling Li and Professor Mehmet Gumus \n
DTSTART:20170530T171500Z
DTEND:20170530T181500Z
LOCATION:Room 310\, Bronfman Building\, CA\, QC\, Montreal\, H3A 1G5\, 1001
  rue Sherbrooke Ouest
SUMMARY:Thesis Defense Presentation: Hedayat Alibeiki
URL:/desautels/channels/event/thesis-defense-presentat
 ion-hedayat-alibeiki-267971
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