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DESCRIPTION:Mr. John J. Han\, a doctoral student at 91ºÚÁÏÍø in th
 e Marketing area will be presenting his thesis defense entitled:\n\nStrate
 gic Interactions in a Market: Incentives and Trust\n\nWednesday\, November
  13\, 2024\, at 10:00 a.m.\n\n(The defense will be conducted on Zoom)\n\nS
 tudent Committee Chair: Professor Ernan Haruvy\n\nPlease note that the Def
 ence will be conducted on Zoom. Only the student and their committee membe
 rs will participate in the presentation.\n\n\nAbstract:\n\nWe investigate 
 strategic interactions between parties with competing interests. The disse
 rtation is composed of two manuscripts\, each focusing on a fundamental bu
 ilding block of an efficient market: incentives and trust.\n\nThe first ch
 apter investigates the decision-making of a mediating agent\, an arbiter\,
  in resolving disputes between two parties that lay proportional claims on
  a fixed quantity of resources. To do so\, the arbiter’s incentive structu
 re was experimentally manipulated in a three-player negotiation game\, and
  the lab data show low incidence of impasses and disagreements when the ar
 biters receive incentive that is equivalent to the payoff of the lowest-pa
 id party. Contrary to existing theories on incentives\, the market was mos
 t efficient when an arbiter was paid less.\n\nThe second chapter investiga
 tes how parties form a trust-based partnership. In the literature on trust
  games\, a cheap talk promise and guilt are known to play a pivotal role i
 n promoting efficiency in forming a partnership. However\, in studies that
  reported their roles\, a promise and guilt are typically confounded with 
 a chance event that obscures the visibility of trustee’s decision\, which 
 correlates with the trustor’s decision. We design and study six variants o
 f a trust game that allows us to disentangle a joint effect of promise\, g
 uilt\, and the chance outcome. We find that the mere presence of the chanc
 e event reduces guilt by the Trustee\, and is incorporated into expectatio
 ns by the trustor. Additionally\, we report evidence that the trustor’s de
 cision does not align with their rational expectation.\n
DTSTART:20241113T150000Z
DTEND:20241113T170000Z
SUMMARY:PhD Thesis Defense Presentation: John J. Han
URL:/desautels/channels/event/phd-thesis-defense-prese
 ntation-john-j-han-360992
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